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Connoisseurship as a Substitute for User 
Research? The Case of the Swiss Watch Industry 
Abstract 
Conventional wisdom holds that new product development is more successfully undertaken when 
design is user led. An exception is the luxury goods sector, in which a common presentation of 
the brand is one where the customer should aspire to the vision of its designers. In such cases, 
the proprietor is often cast as a connoisseur, an expert in the brand's history who is intuitively 
able to give vision and direction. Within the Swiss watch industry, heritage and the illusion of 
exclusivity are vital strategies in the communication of products as luxury items. Connoisseurship 
plays a central role in this communication, establishing the boundaries of brands whose products 
might otherwise appear similar. In such cases, connoisseurship is presented to the customer as 
superior to user research, engendering products with a sophistication which customer insights 
cannot provide. Nonetheless, whilst conventional user research methods play little part in the 
design of Swiss watches, less formal methods are employed. These are shown to also have 
application in non-luxury sectors. The utilisation of strategies employed by the Swiss watch 
industry in future scenarios of new product development is also discussed. 
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Introduction 
Within the field of consumer product design, it often appears axiomatic that industrial design 
should be user-led. Products which focus on the needs of users at the specification and design 
stages are understood to better address those needs and thus lead to greater consumer 
satisfaction and, ultimately, greater profitability (Vredenburg et al, 2002; Design Council, 2008). 
Strategies such as user-centred design and co-design have emerged to systematise the 
integration of user needs into the design process (Sanders and Stappers, 2008), and whilst the 
implementation of such strategies is often criticised as misguided or ineffectual (Goodman-Deane 
et al, 2010; Steen, 2011), it is now commonplace for brands to talk of the extent to which they are 
customer-driven (Binder et al, 2008). 
A notable exception to this focus on satisfying the expressed wishes of consumers is the luxury 
goods sector, in which “classical marketing is the surest way to fail," (Bastien and Kapferer, 2009). 
The aura which surrounds such products is built, in part, on luxury brands' communication of the 
notion that their products have innate qualities which are only appreciable by those with sufficient 
sophistication (Twitchell, 2002, p.98). Asking consumers what they want is clearly inconsistent 
with such myths: instead a common projection is that of the proprietor or designer as connoisseur, 
steeped in the heritage of the brand yet effortlessly able to carry it forward. 
This paper presents two cases from the Swiss watch industry - those of Ulysse Nardin and Bell & 
Ross - whose brand communications deliberately and consistently present connoisseurship as a 
substitute for user research. It begins by discussing how the history of watch manufacturing has 
led to a situation in which ‘Swiss Made’ has become synonymous with the notion of both technical 
quality and luxury. It then contrasts the traditional, 165-year history of Ulysse Nardin with the 
much shorter lineage of Bell & Ross, and shows how both draw on similar notions of the gifted 
auteur to establish their brand messages. The paper explores how both brands successfully 
reconcile the marketing paradox inherent in combining the exclusivity of 'craftsmanship' with the 
desire for growth in sales, and illustrates the role of the connoisseur in negotiating this union in 
ways which are meaningful to their customers. 
The paper then goes on to demonstrate that despite messages to the contrary, both brands do, in 
fact, conduct extensive user research, through informal channels such as hospitality events, 
through reports from authorised dealer networks, by the use of personal selling to valued 
customers, and through the use of limited and bespoke editions. Nonetheless it concludes that in 
an industry which has been superseded by more advanced, digital technologies, where 
innovations are incremental and where market volumes are relatively low, connoisseurship is an 
important strategy for demarcating the boundaries of more than 200 brands which make up the 
Swiss luxury watch industry. The paper ends by discussing whether similar approaches might 
also be relevant in markets not usually considered part of the luxury goods industry, and how they 
might be implemented. 
The Swiss Watchmaking Industry 
Watchmaking in Switzerland first appeared in the mid-19th Century, initially as a response by 
goldsmiths to Calvinist reforms which prohibited the wearing of jewellery (Fédération de l'Industrie 
Horlogère Suisse FH, 2012a). By the end of the century Geneva had established a reputation for 
its high quality timepieces and in 1601 the world's first Watchmakers Guild was established. As 
the city became crowded with watchmakers (by 1790 Geneva exported 60,000 watches annually) 
many moved to the Jura Mountains region, which remains the centre of Swiss watchmaking today. 
Unlike the English watch industry, which in the 18th and 19th centuries was driven by the 
demands of maritime exploration and trade (Smith, 2009), in Switzerland improvements to watch 
design were driven largely by fashion and taste (Glasmeier, 1991). This placed the Swiss industry 
in a commanding position as watches became more affordable, and through the adoption of 
mass production technologies at the beginning of the 1900's Switzerland consolidated its 
domination of the world watch market (Knickerbocker, 1974). 
This domination continued until the 1970's, when the introduction of quartz technology, combined 
with integrated circuitry, decimated the Swiss industry. Competitors from the U.S., Japan and 
Hong Kong were able to produce watches which were simultaneously much cheaper but also far 
more accurate, and in ten years Swiss exports fell from 40% of the world market to only 10% 
(Glasmeier, op. cit.). Factories were forced to close, and many brands consolidated or were 
bought out. 
Throughout the 1980's and to the present day, the Swiss watch industry underwent a remarkable 
transformation, on two fronts. Firstly SMH (one of the conglomerates formed by the merging of 
previously independent companies) introduced Swatch, a precision engineered quartz analogue 
watch, which once again signalled Swiss dominance of the low-cost fashion market (Norman and 
Verganti, 2012). Partly on the back of this success (Swatch Group owns the Breguet, Blancpain 
and Omega brands, amongst others), Swiss watchmaking then aggressively marketed itself as 
the epitome of 'fine timekeeping'. The notion of Swiss-made luxury was carefully managed (in 
order to claim 'Swiss Made', at least 50% of components by value must be Swiss, and assembly 
and inspection must take place in Switzerland) and assiduously protected: the success of this 
strategy is demonstrated by the statistic that in 2011, Switzerland manufactured only 2.6% of the 
world's watches by volume, yet accounted for 54% of the market by value (Deloitte, 2012). 
Ulysse Nardin 
Ulysse Nardin is an independent (i.e. not part of a larger conglomerate) watchmaker, based in Le 
Locle in the Jura mountain region of Switzerland. Whilst it does not have the public recognition of 
brands such as Rolex or Patek Phillippe, amongst watch connoisseurs and collectors it is 
regarded as one of the most innovative (Barge, 2012), having been awarded more patents than 
any other watchmaking company. 
Established in 1846, the company initially made marine chronometers before expanding to 
manufacture pocket and wrist watches. Patents and prizes awarded in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries attest to Ulysse Nardin's reputation as the leading pocket chronometer maker 
(Jaquet et al, 1970: pp.177-179), but after World War 2 the brand's reputation diminished and it 
existed only as a minor player among the Swiss manufacturers. This changed in 1983 when the 
company was acquired by Rolf Schnyder, who employed Dr. Ludwig Oechslin, known for having 
restored the Vatican museum's Farnesian clock, to design a wristwatch sized astrolabium (an 
instrument to measure the altitude and position of celestial bodies). Unveiled in 1985, the 
Astrolabium Galileo Galilei was a critical success, entering the Guinness Book of World Records 
as the most complex watch ever made (Paige, 1999), and presenting the brand's vision of itself 
once again as a leading Swiss watchmaker. Nowadays the company is known for other 
innovations, particularly its perpetual calendars and jaquemarts, its 'Freak' carousel tourbillon, 
and the use of synthetic materials such as silicium and polycrystalline diamond within its watch 
movements. 
Bell & Ross 
Bell and Ross was founded in 1993 by Bruno Belamich and Carlos Rosillo. Initially working in 
partnership with German watch manufacturer Sinn, the brand is known for large, legible displays 
intended to replicate aircraft instrumentation. 
One of the youngest of the Swiss watch brands, Bell and Ross is now part-owned by Chanel and 
headquartered in Paris, though manufacture and assembly is based in La Chaux-de-Fonds in 
Switzerland. Unlike many other brands, including newer entrants to the market such as Urwerk 
and MB&F, Bell and Ross has not attempted to make a name for itself through the design of new 
complications. Instead it has sought to establish its reputation through association with 
organisations such as Recherche Assiance Intervention Dissuasion (RAID), the French counter-
terrorism unit, and Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie National, the French hostage rescue 
unit Hahn, 2012). In this way the company has become known as a maker of tough, reliable and 
overtly masculine watches. 
The Reality and Illusion of Exclusivity 
In order to appreciate the role that connoisseurship plays in the creation of Swiss watches, it is 
first necessary to understand a fundamental difference between traditional approaches to product 
marketing and the marketing of luxury goods, namely the importance of exclusivity. Traditional 
marketing practice involves attempting to raise demand as high as possible, whilst at the same 
time ensuring that that demand can be met. Demand, i.e. popularity, is advertised as proof of the 
product’s worth (Apple, 2011; Tucker and Zhang, 2011; Jeong and Kwon, 2012). Such an 
approach is tantamount to heresy for the luxury brand however, which continually strives to 
emphasise how few people have bought a particular product. Kapferer and Bastien (2009) 
highlight the counter-intuitive nature of luxury marketing strategy when writing that “In order to 
enter the luxury market, to build a successful luxury brand and to make it remain a luxury brand, 
one has to forget the classical marketing rules.” An emphasis on rarity, often to the point where 
the customer must wait for the product to be made and delivered, is a key example of this 
abandoning of marketing principles. 
A product's rarity, and the associated exclusivity of ownership which follows, is crucial for 
charging high prices (Kapferer, 2012) and maintaining the allure of the brand. Historically such 
rarity resulted from the use of materials whose supply was limited - precious metals, gemstones, 
exotic animal skins etc. More recently however, modern industrial mining methods and farming of 
previously rare animals has reduced the natural scarcity of such materials. One response of the 
luxury industry has been to seek out even less readily available supplies - platinum and rhodium, 
for example, or aerospace-grade ceramics. Another has been to communicate a material's 
scarcity, even when such rarity is a myth (Epstein, 1982). The requirement for rarity is also at 
odds with the desire of luxury brands to increase sales, in particular in emerging markets such as 
China and Russia. As Catry (2003) makes clear, "all companies in the luxury goods market face 
the question of whether exclusivity, so central to luxury appeal, is inevitably diluted by increased 
market share." To resolve this apparent paradox, luxury brands have engaged in the creation of 
"artificially induced" rarity (Kapferer, op. cit.), one in which "the product is not objectively limited in 
supply but luxury firms give their buyers an illusion of rarity through the information they deliver." 
(Catry, op. cit.). This communication of artificial rarity, and the illusion of exclusivity it creates, is a 
strategy at which the Swiss watch industry excels. 
Swisstime, which advertises itself as "the reference for Swiss watches and jewellery" (Swisstime, 
2012), lists 339 watch brands, of which approximately half are regarded as true watchmakers 
(usually defined by enthusiasts as those which manufacture their own movements). One feature 
of the Swiss watch industry's contraction in the 1970-80's was that few brands disappeared; 
despite being bought out by other manufacturers or absorbed into conglomerates, brands were 
retained as distinct entities. The Swatch Group, for example, owns 18 brands including Blancpain 
(established in 1735), Breguet (1775) and Omega (1848). Similarly Richemont owns 12 brands 
including A. Lange and Söhne (1845), Jaeger-LeCoultre (1833), Piaget (1874) and Vacheron 
Constantin (1755). 
Retaining a high number of brands is one way in which Switzerland's watch industry has retained 
an aura of exclusivity. The history and heritage of each brand allows it to tell a distinct story to its 
customers, disguising the nature of its owning group's corporate structure. Furthermore, Swiss 
brands individually manufacture relatively few watches each year: Patek Phillipe, for example, 
produces approximately 40,000 units annually (KPMG, 2008). Thus a significant number of 
individual and distinct brands, each manufacturing small numbers of products each year, ensure 
that even while the total number of watches sold is significant (in 2011 Switzerland produced 31 
million pieces (Eschmann, 2012)), the ability to appear exclusive is preserved. 
The high number of Swiss luxury watch brands also disguises another aspect of the industry, 
namely the production of mechanical watch movements by what is known as the 'ebauche' 
tradition (Perez, 2000). Luxury watch brands pride themselves on their production of movements, 
and almost all incorporate complications manufactured in-house in their high end and signature 
pieces. However the majority of brands also use OEM suppliers of movements in their lower price 
models, both to reduce costs and in order to concentrate on those aspects which bring most 
value to the brand, i.e. the design of the visible exterior of the watch. In addition, the provisions of 
Swiss law require that a brand which claims its product is 'Swiss Made' must use a Swiss 
movement (Fédération de l'Industrie Horlogère Suisse FH, 2012b). This has led to a situation in 
which only five manufacturers (ETA, Frederic Piguet, Sellita, TechnoTime and Zenith) supply 
movements to the whole of the Swiss industry.1 Thus, at least at the lower end of the market, 
many brands share the same internal movements, despite their dissimilar outward appearances 
(Figure 1). 
    
Figure 1. The Ulysse Nardin Maxi Marine Chronograph and the Bell & Ross BR03-94 share the same 
ETA 2894 movement. 
 
                                                
1 ETA is owned by Swatch group. As well as manufacturing under its own name, ETA also sells movements using the 
brand names Valjoux and Lemania. Blancpain, which is also owned by Swatch, manufactures movements under the 
brand name Frederic Piguet, but only supplies to Swatch Group brands. 
 Figure 2. Bell & Ross watches using the ETA 2892A2 movement. 
The ebauche tradition is therefore an instrumental part of the production of artificial rarity, in that it 
allows the continuation of small, distinct brands which would otherwise be unable to manufacture 
highly sophisticated movements (Baker, 2000). However it also lays a further role in the 
perception of exclusivity, in that it provides brands with platforms on which to create many 
variants of the same product. The supply of movements by an OEM demands that brands 
incorporate a modular (rather than integrated) architecture within their designs, one in which, 
simplistically, the movement can be 'dropped in' to the watch case. This in turn allows brands to 
create small production runs of watches whose internal configuration, parts and assembly are 
identical. The power of such a system is illustrated in Figure 2: the 39 Bell & Ross watches 
shown all use the same ETA 2892A2 movement. 
In parallel to the strategy of small production runs, the Swiss watch industry also uses limited 
editions to artificially induce exclusivity. Limited editions may incorporate a new design, such as 
the Ulysse Nardin Tellurium J. Kepler, limited to 99 pieces, but are more typically variants of 
standard designs, incorporating new material or colour combinations such as the Ulysse Nardin 
Acqua Perpetual, limited to 500 pieces (Figure 3). In both cases, production is limited to a pre-
determined number of pieces even if customer demand suggests that more units should be 
manufactured. This not only generates publicity (brands will often announce limited editions at 
major trade fairs such as Baselworld), it also ensures a second-hand market amongst collectors 
in which prices are kept high, further adding to the reputation of the brand. 
 
Figure 3. The Ulysse Nardin Acqua Perpetual Limited Edition, number 397 of 500 pieces.  
Connoisseurship as a Substitute for User Research? 
In The Luxury Strategy (2012), Kapferer and Bastien note 24 ways in which traditionally accepted 
marketing principles are abandoned in the marketing of luxury goods. These include seemingly 
paradoxical strategies such as “forget about positioning” and “raise your prices to increase 
demand”. Of these 24 principles, which they term the ‘Anti-Laws of Marketing’, five are directly 
concerned with ways of ensuring the customer’s needs and wishes are kept removed from the 
product design and development process: 
 do not pander to your customer's wishes 
 do not respond to rising demand 
 dominate the client 
 do not test 
 do not look for consensus 
Such approaches are further supported by Okonkwo (2007: pp.132-133), whose seven stages of 
new product development in the luxury goods industry makes no mention of the consideration of 
user requirements during the generation or selection of new product ideas. 
This disregard of customer needs is a deliberate and considered strategy. As Kapferer and 
Bastien (2009, op.cit.) make clear, nothing could be more alien to the luxury brand than "involving 
customers in the shaping of a brand, in co-creation, in consumer empowerment and in creating a 
relational intimacy." Consumers do not purchase luxury products because those products meet 
their functional needs, rather they do so because luxury products "fulfil ego and self esteem 
needs, reinforcing social status and projecting a self image (Okonkwo, op.cit: p.62). A luxury 
brand which sought to portray itself as subservient to its customers needs would thus 
simultaneously destroy the image which caused its customers to aspire to it. By not listening to 
customers however, an obvious danger is that the luxury brand might appear directionless, either 
following whimsical trends or endlessly reinterpreting its own history. It is in giving luxury brands 
direction that the role of the connoisseur is critical. 
Connoisseurship is intimately related to luxury because of luxury's intimate relationship with 
heritage and exclusivity. Heritage is what gives luxury brands depth and prestige (Kapferer, op. 
cit.); it is a core characteristic of a luxury brand (Okonkwo, op.cit: p.105) and is the reason why 
previously referred to brands such as Blancpain and Breguet advertise their date of 
establishment so prominently. In parallel with this exclusivity, style acts as the most important 
denoter of exclusivity in products whose functionality (as in the case of ebauche tradition 
movements) is indistinguishable. Thus the connoisseur, whose credibility relies on a sense of 
history and a "commit[ment] to the idea that style is meaningful" (Neer, 2005), is essential to the 
customer's belief in the validity of a luxury brand. 
The connoisseur within a luxury brand has a dual role: to give creative direction to the brands 
products as well as its image and communication, but also to act as a figurehead (Catry, 2003). 
This is not the same as that conventionally referred to in the literature of connoisseurship. The 
purpose of the art connoisseur, for example, is not to create new work, but rather to apply a 
considered discrimination which "helps him or her make a sophisticated judgment about the worth 
of a piece of art, a judgment that employs criteria appropriate for the genre in which the artist had 
worked" (Donmoyer, 2005). Nonetheless the skills of the art connoisseur are precisely those 
which the luxury brand's director must also employ. 
Connoisseurship requires "judgment informed by intuition… but only if grounded in a thorough 
understanding of the work itself" (Robinson, 1998). It demands the application of discerning 
opinion, however that opinion only gains validity through a foundation of historical knowledge 
(Schwartz, 1988; Van Rees, 1989; Neer, op. cit.). Furthermore, an appreciation of quality is 
fundamental, since "distinctions of quality are both a tool and a goal of the practice of 
connoisseurship" (Ebitz, 1988). An identifiable figure possessing these skills is also essential to a 
luxury brand's image: within the Swiss watch industry this is typically the proprietor in the case of 
long-established brands, though with newer entrants to the market the figurehead is often a 
designer. (In both cases though, and unlike those who gave their names to many Swiss brands, 
the connoisseur is rarely trained as a watchmaker.) 
The notion of the Swiss watch connoisseur as a devotee and defender of heritage is crucial to the 
luxury brand's presentation. In some cases (for example Audemars Piguet, Panerai and TAG 
Heuer) this is achieved by the involvement in the business of family descendants of the original 
founder. In other cases the allusion to heritage must be more carefully constructed. Thus in the 
case of Ulysse Nardin, the corporate myth is of Rolf Schnyder, an "adventurer" and visionary who 
spent much of his life "taking the path less travelled" (Ulysse Nardin, 2011), yet who "found his 
calling, to restore one of the world's greatest names in high-end watchmaking to its former glory" 
(ibid.). Since Schnyder had no previous involvement in Ulysse Nardin's history, it was imperative 
that his name be tied to the brand's heritage in other ways. His biography therefore talks of 
resurrection and rebirth, and "the opportunity to be involved in one of the truly great names in 
"horology" (ibid.). Schnyder's name and his recognition of Ulysse Nardin's historic achievements 
and value are consistently intertwined, such that the brand's vision and future direction are 
indistinguishable from his own. 
For a company such as Bell & Ross, whose history is only two decades old, the task of invoking 
the heritage of connoisseurship is more complex. It is achieved through the brand's designer and 
co-founder, Bruno Belamich, whose story is one of a "passion for the 'instrumentation' look" 
(Thompson, 2010) of aircraft control panels. This is enhanced, and historicised, by references to 
Belamich's internship with the watchmaker Sinn, founded in 1956 by pilot and flight instructor 
Helmut Sinn. Finally it is grounded in the often told challenge of co-founder Rosillo to Belamich to 
"go back to our roots" when designing the BR-01, which was to become the icon of Bell & Ross's 
style. These roots were not those of a brand established in 1994 however, but rather the control 
panels of vintage aircraft. 
The distinctive style of Bell & Ross watches is further legitimised through their use by 
professionals such as pilots, deep sea divers and bomb disposal experts, a fact mentioned in 
virtually all articles about the brand.2 Yet despite an aesthetic which, it is implied, is highly valued 
                                                
2 See for example Disher, 2000; Hahn, 2012, Müller, 2012. 
by such users, nowhere is it suggested that the needs of such professionals might be taken into 
account when designing the watches. To do so would devalue the second requirement of the 
luxury connoisseur figurehead, that of the creative visionary. 
Schwartz (op. cit.) writes that 
“The connoisseur’s sensitivity to style, at its best, can be compared to the ear of the 
musician with absolute pitch, the feeling for numbers of the computation whiz, the 
hunch of the crack detective or the practiced diagnostician. Without being able to tell 
us how they know certain things, they are sure that they do, and we believe them.” 
This ability to see what others do not is of central importance to the luxury brand. Since luxury 
products are aspirational, their design cannot be grounded in the requirements and experiences 
of their customers. Instead, luxury "is the expression of a taste, of a creative identity, of the 
intrinsic passion of a creator… [it] comes from the mind of its creator, driven by a long-term 
vision" (Kapferer and Bastien, op. cit.). In the case of Bell & Ross, this vision manifests itself in 
the image of Belamich as the 'Young Turk', eager to shake up the traditional industry with 
products "way beyond the specifications that most watchmakers boast in their trendy catalogues" 
(Belamich, 2012). For Ulysse Nardin the approach is more subtle; Schnyder is cast as the 
inheritor of the founder's vision, as his company biography relates: 
"he has enabled Ulysse Nardin to transcend its past and achieve an even higher place 
in the rarified constellation of watchmaking’s legends… the spirit of the watchmaker 
Ulysse Nardin has… become inextricably intertwined with Schnyder’s own" (Ulysse 
Nardin, op. cit.) 
Throughout the Swiss watch industry similar stories are invoked, though each with their own 
individual flavour: at Carl F. Bucherer for example the company owner is the founder's great 
grandson, ensuring "the founder's philosophy continues to characterize the brand (Carl F. 
Bucherer, 2013); at Patek Phillipe the father and son presidents "personally stand by all the 
commitments embodied in the Patek Phillipe Seal" (Patek Phillipe, 2013) and advertise using the 
slogan "you never actually own a Patek Phillipe. You merely look after it for the next generation" 
(Leagas Delaney, 2013); whilst at Graham - "an unrepentantly English name for an exquisitely 
English watch" (Graham, 2013a) - the 17th Century watchmaker "would have been proud" of the 
founder's drive to "create a form of mechanical perfection that doesn't look or feel like just another 
Swiss watch “ (Graham, 2013b). 
Whilst the public presentation of a luxury brand precludes an interest in its customers needs, in 
reality a significant amount of user research does, in fact, take place. This is not to say that luxury 
brands covertly engage in conventional practices such as questionnaires or focus groups, but 
rather that user insights are gained through less formal and more subjective methods. Some of 
the ways in which Swiss watch brands gather information about their customers aspirations and 
requirements include: 
Hospitality: The provision of hospitality, whether at sporting events such as Wimbledon 
(sponsored by Rolex), cultural institutions such as the Bolshoi Ballet (sponsored by Audemars 
Piguet), or prestigious trade events such as the Monaco Yacht Fair (sponsored by Ulysse Nardin), 
is one of the most important ways in which luxury watch brands engage with their customers. 
Such events bear little resemblance to more conventional user research exercises: participants 
will be invited rather than recruited; 'research sessions' will be more akin to friendly chats than 
formal interviews; and no attempt will be made at either consistency or impartiality. Yet the 
outcome, particularly when the event involves the brand's connoisseur figurehead, will be the 
accumulation of many small insights into the lifestyles of the brand's best customers (Tynan et al. 
2010). These insights may never be formally recorded, but they will inform, or reinforce, the 
connoisseur’s vision of how the brand should move forward. 
Authorised Dealers: In accordance with Kapferer and Bastien’s (2012, op. cit.) instruction to 
"make it difficult for clients to buy", most Swiss luxury brands sell exclusively through authorised 
dealers or their own boutique stores (Okonkwo, op. cit: p.80). Whilst the primary purpose of such 
a strategy is once again to communicate exclusivity, it also ensures the customer is served by 
trained staff with an understanding of, and loyalty to, the brand. This in turn provides a deep vein 
of customer insight into perceptions of the brand and why one product is purchased rather than 
another. 
Limited Editions: As previously detailed, limited editions are production runs of designs where 
the number of pieces manufactured is deliberately restricted. As there is no expectation of high 
volume sales, a brand which is uncertain of a particular design is able to test  it by launching the 
product as a limited edition and gauging its success. It the product sells well, a very similar 
design can be launched as a standard edition. 
Bespoke Editions: Bespoke editions allow a small number of highly valued (typically wealthy) 
clients to request a unique treatment of a design, which will not be offered to other customers. 
Bespoke pieces are generally considered highly confidential and it is rare to find details of either 
the designs or the customers who commissioned them3. A typical bespoke design exercise will 
involve a commissioned piece, based on a model that already exists, and customisation will 
"include dials and cases with personalized designs and engraving as well as technical details 
such as adding functions to existing calibers... Movement parts, such as rotors and bridges, can 
be hand-engraved or skeletonised as the client wishes" (Doerr, 2009). Bespoke editions therefore 
provide brands with insights as to future themes which products might explore. 
Mass Customisation: Mass customisation is defined as a flexible production system allowing 
individual products to be manufactured with near mass production efficiency (Tseng and Jiao, 
2001). It is usually enabled by a web browser interface, known as a toolkit, which allows 
customers to experiment with different configurations in order to arrive at their ideal product 
(Hippel and Katz, 2002). Within the luxury industry it has yet to undergo widespread adoption 
(Okonkwo, op. cit: p.247), though a number of brands such as Fabergé and Jaeger-LeCoultre 
have attempted to reconcile the apparent tension between the need for exclusivity and the 
ubiquity of the internet. For brands which do adopt mass customisation, the opportunity exists to 
                                                
3 An exception is Andrew Luff, a collector who has ordered a number of bespoke pieces, one of which is based on the 
Ulysse Nardin Diavolo model. See: http://ulyssenardin.watchprosite.com/show-forumpost/f-13/pi-5106698/ti-
768208/s-0/ 
gather data in a similar way to that offered by Bespoke Customisation, though with a much wider 
customer base. 
A Model to be Emulated? 
According to Tynan et al. (op.cit.), "luxury goods sit at one end of a continuum with ordinary 
goods, so where the ordinary ends and luxury starts is a matter of degree." Despite an earlier 
insistence that luxury goods and everyday consumer goods are fundamentally different, (Kapferer 
and Bastien, 2009, op. cit.), Kapferer appears to agree, writing that the "luxury business model 
can be applied to companies in any sector (Kapferer, 2012, op.cit.). It is therefore of relevance to 
consider ways in which non-luxury brands might utilise some of the strategies of luxury marketing, 
and the implications of doing so. 
Kapferer (ibid.) cites Apple as an example of a non-luxury brand which adopts some of the traits 
of the luxury business model. One of the most immediate ways in which this appears to be true is 
in the position of the connoisseur, a role which Steve Jobs performed at least as well as his 
contemporaries in the luxury industry. Following his death, numerous commentators wrote of 
Jobs' 'genius' (Gillmor, 2011; Isaacson, 2011; The Economist, 2011) and the ways in which other 
companies might follow Apple's lead. Undoubtedly the strategy adopted by Apple has been 
successful - it commands considerable brand loyalty and for a time was the world's most valuable 
company (Forbes, 2012). Yet Apple also demonstrates the risk involved in invoking 
connoisseurship without the additional support of heritage. With Jobs no longer the guiding 
figurehead, it is by no means clear that Apple can continue to build on its previous successes 
(BBC News, 2013). 
A second way in which Apple emulates the strategy of luxury brands is in its attitude to user 
research and the extent to which it informs design. Apple's presentation of itself as a company 
which takes no account of user requirements is notorious,  as exemplified in Jobs' exclamation 
"How can I possibly ask somebody what a graphics-based computer ought to be when they have 
no idea what a graphic based computer is?" (Sculley, 2010). By creating an image of the brand 
as one which knows what is best for consumers, better, indeed, than they know themselves, 
Apple clearly follows Kapferer and Bastien's (2012, op. cit.) command not to pander to customer's 
wishes. As such it has become something of a cause célèbre amongst designers annoyed by the 
extent to which they are required to take account of user needs.4 Yet by dividing attention with 
this apparent disregard for its customers opinions, Apple merely follows another of Kapferer and 
Bastien's instructions not to seek consensus. 
A particularly interesting aspect of Apple's reputation with regard to user research is the way in 
which, similarly to luxury brands, it is largely a false construct. As Jobs himself admitted, Apple 
makes extensive use of user testing (Seeking Alpha, 2010), and the information gathered informs 
product development. Furthermore, Apple's own stores (and in particular the 'Genius Bars' where 
customers receive one-on-one advice about their products), are rich sources of information with 
regard to consumers' use of products. 
Clearly Apple does not follow a luxury business model in all its operations. Its outsourcing of 
production to China, and its increase of production to meet demand, are clear violations of the 
'anti laws' of marketing. Nonetheless, Apple demonstrates how a non-luxury brand is able to 
adopt luxury strategies. What these examples do not demonstrate however, is how the principles 
of luxury marketing might apply to future design scenarios. 
Writing of the way in which tool-less additive manufacturing (AM) technologies enable small 
production runs, Campbell et al. (2003) have suggested the potential for the bespoke industrial 
designer. Such a designer would clearly have much in common with the designer of today's 
Swiss watches, which emphasise limited editions and low manufacturing cycles. Whilst luxury 
brands engage in such strategies to promote exclusivity, they nonetheless create a marketplace 
in which many more variants exist than with conventional, mass produced products. In addition, 
despite its apparent lack of enthusiasm for mass customisation, the flexible modularity which 
such systems demand (Pine, 1993) is also closely aligned to the modular architectures required 
                                                
4 See for example http://www.linkedin.com/groupItem?view=&gid=111879&type=member&item=31995513 
by the ebauche tradition of manufacture. Thus designers working for luxury brands, who are 
skilled at the creation of difference whilst simultaneously consolidating a brand's image, may find 
those skills are also ones which non-luxury brands find valuable as AM technologies become 
more common. 
The bespoke industrial designer may also find it necessary to adopt there luxury strategies. 
Speaking at an RSA event titled 'Twenty-First Century Manufacture', Aldersley-Williams (2011) 
proposed that "in the coming decades, what we may see is that design and manufacturing look 
less like they did in the 20th Century, and more like they did in the 14th." In such a future, 
designers exploiting the ability of AM technologies to create unique designs may find themselves 
working directly with customers, following instructions in the manner of pre-Industrial Revolution 
craftsmen, and thus resembling those engaged in the creation of luxury bespoke designs. 
One final scenario in which more conventional design practices might emulate those of luxury 
brands concerns longevity. It is a core principle of sustainable design that the lifespan of products 
should be increased (Cooper, 2010; Spangenberg et al, 2010). Yet this also appears to be at 
odds with consumerist desires to discard and replace products with newer models. However this 
conflict between longevity and consumerism is one which luxury brands navigate effortlessly. 
Luxury products such as Swiss watches have well established logistics of service and repair, and 
a vibrant second-hand market also contributes to their increased lifespan. Clearly the cost of a 
luxury product plays a significant role in the deciding the ease with which it is discarded. 
Nonetheless, looked at over the product's lifetime, a luxury watch may cost little more than the 
buying and replacing of successive products. Thus it may be that the luxury business, often 
regarded as the epitome of consumption, offers clues as to how to conceive sustainable design 
processes. 
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